



**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.
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09/20/1999 09/20/1999 11/11/1999

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11/11/1999

EXAMINER

LANKFORD, JILL

ART UNIT

1651

PAPER NUMBER

5

DATE MAILED:

10/20/1999

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks

Office Action Summary

Application No.

09/380,372

Applicant(s)

KITAMURA, HIDETOMO

Examiner

L. Blaine Lankford

Art Unit

1651

-- The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

Period for Reply

A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY IS SET TO EXPIRE 3 MONTH(S) FROM THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION.

- Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136 (a). In no event, however, may a reply be timely filed after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days will be considered timely.
- If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period will apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication.
- Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, cause the application to become ABANDONED (35 U.S.C. § 133).
- Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of this communication, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

Status

- 1) ☐ Responsive to communication(s) filed on ____.
- 2a) ☐ This action is **FINAL**. 2b) ☒ This action is non-final.
- 3) ☐ Since this application is in condition for allowance except for formal matters, prosecution as to the merits is closed in accordance with the practice under *Ex parte Quayle*, 1935 C.D. 11, 453 O.G. 213.

Disposition of Claims

- 4) ☐ Claim(s) 1-20 is/are pending in the application.
- 4a) Of the above claim(s) ____ is/are withdrawn from consideration.
- 5) ☐ Claim(s) ____ is/are allowed.
- 6) ☐ Claim(s) 1-20 is/are rejected.
- 7) ☐ Claim(s) ____ is/are objected to.
- 8) ☐ Claims ____ are subject to restriction and/or election requirement.

Application Papers

- 9) ☐ The specification is objected to by the Examiner.
- 10) ☐ The drawing(s) filed on ____ is/are objected to by the Examiner.
- 11) ☐ The proposed drawing correction filed on ____ is: a) ☐ approved b) ☐ disapproved.
- 12) ☐ The oath or declaration is objected to by the Examiner.

Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119

- 13) ☒ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d).
- a) ☒ All b) ☐ Some * c) ☐ None of:
1. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received.
2. ☐ Certified copies of the priority documents have been received in Application No. ____.
3. ☒ Copies of the certified copies of the priority documents have been received in this National Stage application from the International Bureau (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).
- * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of the certified copies not received.
- 14) ☐ Acknowledgment is made of a claim for domestic priority under 35 U.S.C. & 119(e).

Attachment(s)

- 15) ☒ Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)
- 16) ☐ Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948)
- 17) ☐ Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449) Paper No(s) ____
- 18) ☐ Interview Summary (PTO-413) Paper No(s). ____
- 19) ☐ Notice of Informal Patent Application (PTO-152)
- 20) ☐ Other: ____

DETAILED ACTION

The following is a quotation of the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.

Claims 5-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which applicant regards as the invention.

Claims 8-9 & 18 are drawn to a kit but do not define such a kit instead only stating that the kit comprises a cell line.

Claims 5-7 & 15-17 provides for the use of a cell line, but, since the claim does not set forth any steps involved in the method/process, it is unclear what method/process applicant is intending to encompass. A claim is indefinite where it merely recites a use without any active, positive steps delimiting how this use is actually practiced.

Claims 5-7 & 15-17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed recitation of a use, without setting forth any steps involved in the process, results in an improper definition of a process, i.e., results in a claim which is not a proper process claim under 35 U.S.C. 101. See for example *Ex parte Dunki*, 153 USPQ 678 (Bd.App. 1967) and *Clinical Products, Ltd. v. Brenner*, 255 F. Supp. 131, 149 USPQ 475 (D.D.C. 1966).

Please note that the language of a claim must make it clear what subject matter the claim encompasses to adequately delineate its "metes and bounds". See, e.g., the following decisions: *In re Hammack*, 427 F.2d. 1378, 1382, 166 USPQ 204, 208 (CCPA 1970); *In re Venezia* 530 F.2d. 956, 958, 189 USPQ 149, 151 (CCPA 1976); *In re Goffe*, 526 F.2d. 1393, 1397, 188 USPQ 131, 135 (CCPA 1975); *In re Watson*, 517 F.2d. 465, 477, 186 USPQ 11, 20 (CCPA 1975); *In re Knowlton* 481 F.2d. 1357, 1366, 178 USPQ 486, 492 (CCPA 1973). The courts have also indicated that before claimed subject matter can

properly be compared to the prior art, it is essential to know what the claims do in fact cover. See, e.g., the following decisions: *In re Steele*, 305 F.2d. 859, 134 USPQ 292 (CCPA 1962); *In re Moore* 439 F.2d. 1232, 169 USPQ 236 (CCPA 1969); *In re Merat*, 519 F.2d. 1390, 186 USPQ 471 (CCPA 1975).

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102

The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action:

A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -

(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States.

The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action:

(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims under 35 U.S.C. 103(a), the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned at the time any inventions covered therein were made absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and invention dates of each claim that was not commonly owned at the time a later invention was made in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and potential 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).

Claims 1-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) as being anticipated by or, in the alternative, under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as obvious over Grigoriadis et al (J of Cell Biology, 106, 1998, 2139-2151).

Grigoriadis teaches a mesenchymal cell line which can differentiate into diverse cell types. The reference also discloses factors which cause such differentiation. The reference anticipates the claim subject matter.

Although the instant cell line is defined as being "derived from a normal adult, the application does not demonstrate any difference between the cell line claimed and that disclosed in the prior art nor does it provide any factual evidence whatsoever to refute the holding of anticipation. Note specifically that on the current record the only way of overcoming such a clear holding of anticipation is factual proof that the rejection is in error. See MPEP § 2112, disclosing that once a proper holding of anticipation is made, the burden shifts to applicant to demonstrate an unobvious difference between the claims and the prior art. See also, *In re Best*, 562 F.2d 1252, 1255, 195 USPQ 430, 433 (CCPA 1977) ("the PTO can require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his claimed product"). Because applicant has not demonstrated any difference between the claimed products and the prior art products, the rejection of record clearly must be made.

Also note that the material of claims 10-13 and 19-20 would be anticipated by any factor known in the art or simply by any product tested, i.e. the product must be known

in order for it to be tested and even though the claimed activity may not be known, the material per se was known.

Note that MPEP § 706.3(e) states that:

"[w]hen the prior art discloses a product which reasonably appears to be either identical with or only slightly different than a product claimed in a product-by-process claim, a rejection based alternatively on either section 35 U.S.C. 102 or 35 U.S.C. 103 of the statute is appropriate. As a practical matter, the Patent and Trademark Office is not equipped to manufacture products by the myriad of processes put before it and then obtain prior art products and make physical comparisons therewith. A lesser burden of proof is required to make out a case of prima facie obviousness for product-by-process claims because of their peculiar nature than when a product is claimed in the conventional fashion. *In re Brown*, 59 CCPA 1063, 173 USPQ 685 (1972) ; *In re Fessmann*, 180 USPQ 324 (CCPA1974)."

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 1-3 & 5-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112, first paragraph, as containing subject matter which was not described in the specification in such a way as to reasonably convey to one skilled in the relevant art that the inventor(s), at the time the application was filed, had possession of the claimed invention.

The claims are essentially of limitless breadth. It is implied that so long as the specification provides one with the ability to test any particular embodiment which is encompassed by the material limitations of a claim, one can thereby distinguish between those embodiments which meet the functional limitations from those embodiments which don't. This argument is not entirely without merit. However, the

issue here is the breadth of the claims in light of the predictability of the art as determined by the number of working examples, the skill level of the artisan and the guidance presented in the instant specification and the prior art of record. This 'make and test' position is inconsistent with the decisions in *In re Fisher*, 427 F.2d 833, 166 USPQ 18 (CCPA 1970), *Amgen v. Chugai Pharmaceuticals Co. Ltd.*, 13 USPQ2d, 1737 (1990), and *In re Wands*, 8 USPQ2d, 1400 (CAFC 1988). *In re Wands* stated that the factors to be considered in determining whether a disclosure would require undue experimentation include (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art and, (8) the breadth of the claims.

Breadth alone is not the issue, however. *In re Fisher*, 427 F.2d 833, 166 USPQ 18 (CCPA 1970), held that

"Inventor should be allowed to dominate future patentable inventions of others where those inventions were based in some way on his teachings, since such improvements while unobvious from his teachings, are still within his contribution, since improvement was made possible by his work; however, he must not be permitted to achieve this dominance by claims which are insufficiently supported and, hence, not in compliance with first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112; that paragraph requires that scope of claims must bear a reasonable correlation to scope of enablement provided by specification to persons of

ordinary skill in the art; in cases involving predictable factors, such as mechanical or electrical elements, a single embodiment provides broad enablement in the sense that, once imagined, other embodiments can be made without difficulty and their performance characteristics predicted by resort to known scientific law; in cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological activity, scope of enablement varies inversely with degree of unpredictability of factors involved."

Having established the breadth of the claims, *Wands* now requires that one consider the number of working examples presented in the instant specification.

The premise that the standard under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, is that of isolating a subject cell line and testing to see if it obtains the desired biological activity is a position that has been routinely dismissed by the courts, as shown by those decisions cited above.

The breadth of claims must be based upon the predictability of the claimed subject matter and not on some standard of trial and error. To argue that one can make material embodiments of the invention and then test for those that work in the manner disclosed or that the instant claims only encompass the working embodiments is judicially unsound. Unless one has a reasonable expectation that any one material embodiment of the claimed invention would be more likely than not to function in the manner disclosed or the instant specification provides sufficient guidance to permit one to identify those embodiments which are more likely to work than not without actually

making and testing them then the instant application does not support the breadth of the claims. In the instant case it is highly improbable that any cell line will more likely than not perform in the manner disclosed and the instant specification does not provide the guidance needed to find other cell lines with the desired functional property with any reasonable expectation that such cell lines will be found.

Claims 1-3 imply that other cell lines with the claim designated properties can be found using the method disclosed in the specification without undue experimentation.

Whether or not the disclosure provides an enabling disclosure, it does not provide a written description of the desired cell lines which is necessary to provide a written description of the cell lines of claims 1-3. The functional property is not itself a written description of that cell line, it conveys no distinguishing information concerning its identity, just its functional property. While the disclosure provides a process for obtaining additional cell lines with the claimed properties, there is no further information in the application pertaining to the desired cell lines characteristics; in other words, it does not describe cell lines having the desired functional property in general. Describing a method of finding a suitable cell line having the desired functional property, as in the example, does not necessarily describe the desired cell line itself.

Every species in a genus need not be described in order that a genus meet the written description requirement. See *Utter*, 845 F.2d at 998- 99, 6 USPQ2d at 1714 ("A specification may, within the meaning of § 112, first paragraph, contain a written description of a broadly claimed invention without describing all species that claim encompasses.") In claims to an species from a genus, however, a generic statement without more, is not an adequate written description of the genus because it does not distinguish the claimed species of the genus from others, except by the alleged function. It does not specifically define any of the species of that genus that fall within its

definition. It does not define any features (as commonly used in the art of microbiology or cell biology) which are commonly possessed by members of the genus that distinguish them from others. One skilled in the art therefore cannot, as one can do with a fully described genus, visualize or recognize the identity of the members of the genus. A definition by function, does not suffice to define the genus because it is only an indication of what the genus does, rather than what it is. See *Fiers*, 984 F.2d at 1169-71, 25 USPQ2d at 1605-06 (discussing Amgen). It is only a definition of a useful result rather than a definition of what achieves that result. Many such species of the genus may achieve that result. The description requirement of the patent statute requires a description of an invention, not an indication of a result that one might achieve if one made that invention. See *In re Wilder*, 736 F.2d 1516, 1521, 222 USPQ 369, 372-73 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming rejection because the specification does "little more than outlin[e] goals appellants hope the claimed invention achieves and the problems the invention will hopefully ameliorate."). Accordingly, naming a type of material generally known to exist, in the absence of knowledge as to what that material consists of, is not a description of that material.


Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to L Blaine Lankford whose telephone number is 308-2455. The examiner can normally be reached on Mon-Thu 7:30-6.

If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's supervisor, Mike Wityshyn can be reached on 308-4743. The fax phone numbers for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned are 703-308-4242 for regular communications and 703-308-4242 for After Final communications.

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Any inquiry of a general nature or relating to the status of this application or proceeding should be directed to the receptionist whose telephone number is 308-0196.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'L. Blaine Lankford', written in a cursive style.

L Blaine Lankford
Primary Examiner
Art Unit 1651

LBL

December 18, 2000